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I. INTRODUCTION
A. History and Background of the Privilege
History suggests that the attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the
evidentiary privileges.' It probably arose at common law during the
1500's, concurrent with the right to trial by jury.2 Judges initially viewed
the privilege as a vindication of "the oath and the honor of the attor-
ney."3 However, during the late 1700's, courts began to assert that the
privilege's purpose was to encourage clients to make full disclosure to
their counsel, by "providing subjectively for the client's freedom of ap-
prehension."'4 In 1871, the Virginia Supreme Court5 stated that "[i]f the
privilege did not exist at all, every one would be thrown upon his own
legal resources; deprived of all professional assistance, a man would not
venture to consult any skillful person, or would only dare to tell his coun-
sel half his case." 6 Today, courts continue to state that the benefits of full
disclosure justify the privilege, and frequently assert that without such
full disclosure an attorney may not be able to adequately advise his
client.7
Although the attorney-client privilege has been established for hun-
dreds of years under the common law, many states have enacted attor-
ney-client privilege statutes.8 The federal courts continue to follow the
common law rules for the privilege in cases involving federal law.9 How-
ever, in diversity cases,10 federal courts must use the applicable state
1. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (J. McNaughton ed. 1961).
2. Id.
3. Id. (emphasis in original).
4. Id. (emphasis in original).
5. Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871).
6. Id. at 838.
7. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-92 (1981); Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291.
8. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 950-62 (West 1966); FL. STAT. ANN. § 90.502 (West 1979);
see also 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2292.
9. The following rule applies in federal court cases:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, . . . shall be governed by the principles
of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with
respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of
decision, the privilege of a witness, person .... shall be determined in accordance
with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
10. When the federal court's jurisdiction is based on diversity, state law provides the rule
of decision. However, if the federal court's jurisdiction is based on a federal regulation, stat-
ute, or the United States Constitution, the federal law provides the rule of decision. See,
e.g., Richards of Rockford, Inc. v Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal. 1976); see
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privilege statute or the state's rules derived from common law. Virginia
has not codified the privilege, possibly because the attorney-client privi-
lege is so well entrenched in the common law that no statute on point is
necessary. 1
This note will review the attorney-client privilege,12 focusing in part on
Virginia's interpretation of the privilege. The privilege will be defined and
the necessary elements explained. Exceptions to the privilege and the cli-
ent's ability to waive the privilege will also be discussed. The note will
also review two controversial uses of the privilege: the protection of client
identity and fee information, 3 and the attorney's knowledge of instru-
mentalities of a crime.' 4 The note will conclude with a summary of cur-
rent views regarding the scope of the privilege.
B. General Definition of the Privilege
There are eight essential components of the attorney-client privilege:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that pur-
pose (4) made in confidence (5) by the client (6) are at his instance perma-
nently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor,
(8) except the protection be waived."5
The claimant has the burden of proving that the elements of the privilege
also FED. R. Evm. 501. The United States Supreme Court proposed a codification of the
common law in regard to the privilege. Proposed FFD. R. Evin. 503. However, Proposed Rule
503 was not adopted by Congress. See Note, Confidential Communication Privileges Under
Federal and Virginia Law, 13 U. Rica L. REv. 593 (1979). If Rule 503 had been passed, the
federal courts would be compelled to apply it in all federal court cases, including diversity
cases. Id. at 595. Although Rule 503 was never adopted, it has been cited as persuasive
authority. See, e.g., United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336-37 (7th Cir. 1979) (as-
serting that Proposed Rule 503 is a useful guide to federal courts in developing the common
law).
11. Virginia still relies on the common law in determining its application. See Chahoon,
62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 836 ("There is no rule of law better settled than 'that a counsel, solici-
tor or attorney shall not be permitted to divulge any matter which has been communicated
to him in professional confidence.'") (quoting 2 STARKM, EviDENCE 395).
12. Topics related to the attorney-client privilege, such as the work product doctrine of
evidence, are beyond the scope of this note. The work product doctrine provides a qualified
privilege for writings which are prepared in anticipation of litigation. It differs from the
attorney-client privilege in that it is a qualified privilege which may not protect the material
if good cause is shown, see FED. R. Cv. P. 26, whereas the attorney-client privilege, once
established, is absolute unless waived by the client. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495
(1974).
13. See infra notes 104-207 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 208-95 and accompanying text.
15. NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 904 (4th Cir. 1965) (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note
1, § 2292).
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are satisfied."i Once proved, the privilege belongs to the client and not to
the attorney,17 and may be waived only at the client's option. s It does not
cease merely because the attorney-client relationship has ended. The at-
torney-client privilege applies regardless of whether the communication is
sought to be put in evidence by direct examination, cross-examination,
"or indirectly as by bringing out facts brought to knowledge solely by
reason of a confidential communication."'" Both the attorney's and the
client's testimony regarding a confidential consultation are privileged.20 A
court will not compel a litigant or his attorney to testify even if the fail-
ure to reveal the confidential communication impedes the administration
of justice.2
In In re Shargel,22 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated
that "[tihe underlying theory. . . is that encouraging clients to make the
fullest disclosure to their attorneys enables the latter to act more effec-
tively, justly, and expeditiously, and that these benefits outweigh the
risks posed by barring full revelation in court.' 23 However, since the at-
torney-client privilege prevents disclosure of relevant evidence and im-
pedes the quest for truth,'2 4 "it must be strictly construed within the nar-
rowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle."' 5 The
Supreme Court has stated that the privilege will be applied only when
necessary to achieve its purpose of protecting the confidential relation-
16. See In re Shapiro, 381 F. Supp. 21, 22 (N.D. IMI. 1974); see also Robertson v. Com-
monwealth, 181 Va. 520, 540, 25 S.E.2d 352, 360 (1943) ("Since exemption from production
is the exception and not the rule, the burden is on the party claiming the privilege to show
that he is entitled to it. His mere assertion that the matter is confidential and privileged will
not suffice.").
17. See Parker v. Carter, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 273, 287 (1814); see also Hunter v. Kenney, 77
N.M. 336, 442 P.2d 623 (1967) (holding that the privilege is the client's alone and that the
attorney has an affirmative duty to assert it unless it is waived by the client). But cf. United
States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (holding that an attorney could raise the
privilege as a defense to an obstruction of justice charge). See generally 8 J. WIGMOPE, supra
note 1, § 2327.
18. See Virginia State Bar v. Gunter, 212 Va. 278, 287, 183 S.E.2d 713, 719 (1971) (citing
Grant v. Harris, 116 Va. 642, 648-49, 82 S.E. 718, 719 (1914)).
19. State v. Sullivan, 60 Wash. 2d 214,_, 373 P.2d 474, 476 (1962) (emphasis in original)
(quoting 58 AM. JuR. Witnesses § 466 (1948)).
20. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2324, and cases cited therein.
21. See Gunter, 212 Va. at 287, 183 S.E.2d at 719.
22. 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984).
23. Id. at 62 (quoting J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, EVIDENCE 1 503(02) (1982)); see also C.
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 87, at 205 (3d ed. 1984) (someone criminally accused may withhold
acknowledgment of guilt in fear of his counsel's compelled testimony); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 1, § 2291, at 554.
24. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 671-72 (5th Cir. 1975) ("The
purpose of the privilege-to suppress truth-runs counter to the dominant aims of the
law.").
25. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 554 (footnote omitted).
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ship between the attorney and client.26
II. SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE
A. Legal Services
1. Defining "Legal Services"
The attorney-client privilege generally requires that a communication
be made to an attorney 7 in anticipation of his employment. However, the
communication may be privileged even if his employment does not fol-
low. 28 Furthermore, the fact that no payment is made for the legal ser-
vices does not necessarily negate the privilege.29
The attorney-client privilege will apply to both communications con-
cerning litigation and communications regarding legal advice not pertain-
ing to litigation. In NLRB v. Harvey,30 the. Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the privilege extends to communications concerning an
opinion of law, general legal services, or assistance in some legal proceed-
ing."1 The Harvey opinion provides general guidance for attorneys in as-
serting the privilege, but it does not address specific instances of when
the privilege is inapplicable. Therefore, most jurisdictions have adopted
more specific rules in deciding what constitutes legal services.
For example, where an attorney merely drafts an agreement, such as a
deed, which embodies the parties' intent, most courts have held the privi-
lege inapplicable because the attorney's professional role is minimal.3 2 In
26. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
27. A question arises, however, as to whether the privilege applies when a person mistak-
enly confides in a person he believes to be an attorney, but who in fact is not. Although
there is a split of authority, the better view appears to be that such a communication is
privileged. E.g., C. McCOR16ICK, supra note 23, § 88, at 208 n.2 (citing People v. Barker, 60
Mich. 277, 27 N.W. 539 (1886) (confession to a detective pretending to be an attorney held
privileged)). But cf. Dabney v. Investment Corp. of America, 82 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(communication to an unsupervised law student was not privileged). The Virginia Supreme
Court has not yet addressed this issue.
28. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 635 (9th Cir. 1960).
29. See Hodge v. Garten, 116 W. Va. 564, , 182 S.E. 582, 583 (1935) (where an attorney
provided substantial services for a client, the fact that the client did not pay for all of the
services did not render the privilege inapplicable in regard to the services not paid for).
30. 349 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1965).
31. Id. at 905.
32. See, e.g., Cranston v. Stewart, 184 Kan. 99, _ 334 P.2d 337, 340 (1959). But cf.
Hodge v. Garten, 116 W. Va. 564, _, 182 S.E. 582, 583 (1935) (the privilege applies to
communications involving the drafting of a deed). It has also been held that when an attor-
ney is acting as an accountant, the privilege does not apply. In re Shapiro, 381 F. Supp. 21,
22-23 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (asserting, however, that the privilege does apply with regard to the
preparation of tax forms, if the preparation is combined with significant other legal services
rendered by an attorney). See generally C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 23, § 88; 81 Am. JuR. 2D
Witnesses § 182 (1976).
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Virginia, the prevailing view is that as long as an attorney is acting in the
line of his profession, he is bound by the privilege.3 3 Thus in Parker v.
Carter,3 4 the Virginia Supreme Court held that an attorney employed to
draft a deed was performing legal services and was therefore bound to
conceal the facts disclosed by his client.3 5 However, in Cook v. Hayden3
the court noted that other jurisdictions view an attorney preparing a deed
as a "mere scrivener," and hold that the privilege does not apply.3 7 Since
Parker is over a century old,38 and is against the weight of modern au-
thority, the Virginia Supreme Court may overrule Parker and hold the
privilege inapplicable where the attorney is acting as a "mere scrivener."
2. Who Receives Legal Services: The Corporate Client
The corporate setting creates special problems in deciding whether the
attorney-client privilege applies. Traditionally, when corporate employees
communicated with the corporation's attorney, the privilege only ex-
tended to those employees within the "control group" of the corpora-
tion.3 9 However, in Upjohn Co. v. United States,40 the United States Su-
preme Court rejected the control group test and asserted that the
privilege could apply to lower echelon employees. The Court held that
such employees may assert the privilege if they possess important infor-
mation which an attorney must know in order to adequately advise the
corporation."'
In Upjohn, the Court enumerated six factors to be considered in decid-
33. Parker v. Carter, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 273, 285-86 (1814).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 285.
36. 183 Va. 203, 31 S.E.2d 625 (1944).
37. Id. at 224, 31 S.E.2d at 633. In Cook, the Virginia Supreme Court avoided the issue of
whether preparing a deed constitutes legal services, and held that the privilege did not ap-
ply because of the presence of the adverse party at the time of the communication. Id. at
224, 31 S.E.2d at 634. For a discussion of the effects of a third person's presence during
communications, see infra notes 69-86 and accompanying text.
38. It was decided in 1814.
39. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 400-
01 (E.D. Va. 1975) (the "control group" test should be applied). Under the "control group"
test, communications by an employee of the corporation will be privileged only where the
"communicant [is] in a position to control or take a substantial part in a decision about any
action to be taken upon the advice of the lawyer, or [where] the communicant [is] a member
of the group having such authority." Id. at 400. However, some jurisdictions believed that
the "control group" formulation was overly restrictive and adopted various forms of a "sub-
ject matter" test. This test asserts that if the employee is acting in the scope of his employ-
ment and makes communications at the direction of his superiors, the privilege applies.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd per
curiam by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971); Marriott Corp. v. American Acad-
emy of Psychotherapists, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 497, -, 277 S.E.2d 785, 791-92 (1981).
40. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
41. Id. at 391-92.
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ing whether the privilege applies.42 However, the Court did not explain
the significance of the factors and failed to articulate any firm guidelines
for their application. 43 Further, the Upjohn decision is limited to cases
arising under federal question jurisdiction, leaving the state courts free to
determine how far the privilege extends in the corporate context.
4 4
B. Subject Matter of the Privilege
Once an attorney-client relationship exists and the attorney performs
legal services, an attorney must consider the scope of the privilege. The
general rule is that the privilege applies only to confidential communica-
tions. 5 Courts have interpreted this rule to include both the communica-
tions made by the client to the attorney and the attorney's statements in
response to the client's communications.46 Otherwise, "the compelled dis-
closure of an attorney's communications or advice to the client [would]
effectively reveal the substance of the client's confidential communication
to the attorney.
'47
Since the privilege depends on a communication, considerable author-
ity holds that the privilege applies only to words spoken by the client and
not to an attorney's observation of the client's physical and mental
state . 4  Furthermore, in Parsons v. Commonwealth,49 the Virginia Su-
preme Court held that a prosecutor's question about the employment of
counsel for a co-defendant charged with the same offense did not require
42. The factors which the Court considered in determining that the privilege was applica-
ble in Upjohn were that (1) the communications were made by Upjohn employees at the
direction of corporate superiors, (2) so that Upjohn could receive legal advice from counsel;
(3) the communications concerned matters within the scope of the employee's duties (4)
'which were not available from upper-level directors; (5) the employees were told the pur-
pose of the communications; and (6) the communications were considered confidential when
made and were not disseminated outside the corporation. Note, The Attorney-Client Privi-
lege and the Corporate Client: Where Do We Go After Upjohn?, 81 MICH. L. REv. 665, 673
n.20 (1983) (citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394).
43. Id. at 673 (citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394).
44. See the discussion of FED. R. Evm. 501, supra note 10 and accompanying text. The
Virginia Supreme Court has also held that "[a] statement by the accredited agent of a cor-
poration, giving his account of how an accident occurred, and given for the use of counsel in
pending or threatened litigation is likewise privileged." Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181
Va. 520, 25 S.E.2d 352, 360 (1943) (suggesting that the corporation's privilege may extend to
communications made by any accredited agent of the corporation).
45. See supra text accompanying note 15.
46. United States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253, 260-61 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (citing United States
v. Ramirez, 608 F.2d 1261, 1268 n.12 (9th Cir. 1979)).
47. King, 536 F. Supp. at 261 (quoting In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1977)).
48. See; e.g., Cook v. Hayden, 183 Va. 203, 224, 31 S.E.2d 625, 633-34 (1944) (identifying
prior cases that limited the attorney-client privilege to the client's verbal communications;
case decided on different grounds).
49. 154 Va. 832, 152 S.E. 547 (1930).
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the client to disclose a confidential communication to an attorney.5 0 The
court reasoned that since the client was not required to disclose anything
he had said to his own attorney, the privilege did not apply.51 Finally, the
privilege usually does not apply to questions concerning the identity of
the client and the payment of fees for legal services.2
The applicability of the privilege to an attorney's receipt of client docu-
ments presents a special situation. The general rule with regard to such
documents is that "[wihen the client himself would be privileged from
production of the document, either as a party at common law. . . or as
exempt from self incrimination, the attorney having possession of the
document is not bound to produce. '5 3 However, if the client himself could
have been compelled to produce the document, the attorney may also be
compelled to do so.54 In Robertson v. Commonwealth,55 the Virginia Su-
preme Court asserted that an accident report compiled by a client, for the
bona fide purpose of later being transmitted to an attorney for advice
regarding pending or anticipated litigation, is privileged.56 The court held
that "such [a] statement is itself a part of the communication from the
client to his counsel. ' '51 However, the court noted that an accident report
prepared in the ordinary course of the client's business was not privi-
leged, whether in possession of the client or the attorney.,8 This rule ad-
vances the purpose of the privilege by encouraging full disclosure while
preventing a client from protecting nonprivileged documents by merely
handing them over to his attorney.59
The evidentiary privilege applied to written documents is also applica-
ble to tangible evidence and instrumentalities of a crime."0 Thus, if a cli-
ent turns over such evidence, the attorney may be compelled to produce
50. Id. at 849, 152 S.E. at 553.
51. Id.
52. See infra notes 104-207 and accompanying text.
53. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 404 (1975) (quoting 8 J. WIGORE, supra note 1,
§ 2307) (emphasis in original).
54. Id. at 403-04 (numerous citations omitted).
55. 181 Va. 520, 25 S.E.2d 352 (1943).
56. Id. at 539-40, 25 S.E.2d at 360.
57. Id. at 539, 25 S.E.2d at 360 (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2318, at 677).
58. Id. at 540, 25 S.E.2d at 360. As already noted, the person claiming the privilege has
the burden of proving it. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. To determine if an
accident report or other document is a communication from client to attorney, the court
should consider the client's intent at the time the report was written. If it was compiled in
the ordinary scope of business with no intention of being transmitted to an attorney, it does
not become a communication even though at some later date it does communicate to the
attorney the circumstances surrounding the incident. See id. at 539, 25 S.E.2d at 360.
59. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403-04; see also People v. Ryan, 40 Ill. App. 2d 352, 189
N.E.2d 763 (1963) (a statement given by an insured to his insurer, when the insurance com-
pany had a duty to defend, was privileged), rev'd on other grounds, 30 IM. 2d 456, 197
N.E.2d 15 (1964).
60. See infra notes 208-95 and accompanying text.
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it because it was not privileged while in the client's possession."1
Although an attorney may be compelled to produce tangible evidence
of a crime, communications in regard to a crime which has already been
committed are privileged.6 2 On the other hand, the privilege does not ex-
tend to communications made while contemplating a crime or perpetrat-
ing a fraud. 3 In Virginia State Bar v. Gunter,6 4 a commonwealth's attor-
ney allegedly agreed to represent the plaintiff in a civil suit prior to the
civil defendant's pleading guilty to a criminal charge involving the same
incident.6 5 The Virginia Supreme Court held that communications made
by the commonwealth's attorney to his lawyer prior to a disciplinary pro-
ceeding were not privileged because such communications "were made in
the furtherance of an intended fraud on the [bar] committee." 66
C. The Confidentiality Requirement
Generally, the attorney-client privilege will apply only if the communi-
cation was confidential,6 7 and will not apply where the communication
was made to an attorney for purposes of public disclosure.6 8 Also, the
privilege may not apply when the communication was made to, or in the
presence of, a third person.6 9 For example, in Cook v. Hayden,70 the Vir-
61. See In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 366 (E.D. Va. 1967). Ryder's distinction between
fruits and instrumentalities of a crime, which may be seized while in the client's possession,
and "mere evidence", which may not be seized, is no longer valid. Shortly after the holding
in Ryder, the United States Supreme Court held that "mere evidence" was subject to a
reasonable seizure. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-10 (1967). The logical extension of
Ryder's rationale is that an attorney may be compelled to produce "mere evidence" which
his client gives him.
62. See, e.g., State v. Douglas, 20 W. Va. 770 (1882) (holding that it was reversible error
for an attorney to testify as to where a client told him a weapon could be found). See gener-
ally Annot., 16 A.LR3D 1029 (1967) (citing numerous cases).
63. See, e.g., Codgil v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 272, 276, 247 S.E.2d 392, 395 (1978);
Virginia State Bar v. Gunter, 212 Va. 278, 287, 183 S.E.2d 713, 719 (1971); see also United
States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253, 261 (C.D. Cal. 1982) ("[A] client cannot invoke the privi-
lege where the desired legal advice relates not to the client's past wrongdoing, but to his
intended or continuing criminal conduct."). But cf. McNeill v. Thomas, 203 N.C. 219, _
165 S.E. 712, 714 (1932) (rejecting exception on the basis of disclosure of contemplated acts
not clearly criminal).
64. 212 Va. 278, 183 S.E.2d 713 (1971).
65. Id. at 279, 183 S.E.2d at 714.
66. Id. at 288, 183 S.E.2d at 719-20 (attorney's attempt to postdate letter evidencing con-
flict of interest revealed by communications). Furthermore, the Virginia court asserted that
this exception to the privilege applies even if the client did not disclose his fraudulent pur-
pose to his attorney at the time of the communication. Id. at 287, 183 S.E.2d at 719.
67. See supra text accompanying note 15; see also Cook v. Hayden, 183 Va. 203, 224, 31
S.E.2d 625, 633-34 (1944) (a communication made in the presence of the client's adverse
party was not confidential and therefore not privileged).
68. See State v. Sullivan, 60 Wash. 2d 214, ._, 373 P.2d 474, 476 (1962).
69. See Cook, 183 Va. at 224, 31 S.E.2d at 633-34.
70. 183 Va. 203, 31 S.E.2d 625.
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ginia Supreme Court held that where the grantee was present at an inter-
view which took place between the grantor and his attorney, and the
grantee testified as to what occurred at the interview, the attorney-client
privilege did not exist. Therefore, the attorney's testimony concerning the
interview was properly admitted. 71 Furthermore, a communication by one
party to an opposing party's attorney is not privileged.72
A difficult question arises when a third person, of whom the client is
unaware, hears the client's communication. Under such circumstances,
most courts have ruled that the eavesdropper may testify.7 3 McCormick
suggests that if the client used reasonable precautions to prevent being
overheard, the eavesdropper, as well as the attorney, should be prevented
from testifying.74 However, the majority view generally ignores the cir-
cumstances of the conversation.7"
There are several other possible exceptions to the general rule that a
third person's presence destroys the privilege. In Chahoon v. Common-
wealth,70 the Virginia Supreme Court asserted that a statement made by
a defendant to his co-defendants' attorneys was privileged.7 The court
also held that the co-defendants' communications to their attorneys, in
the defendant's presence, were privileged.78 Furthermore, the privilege
71. Id. at 224, 31 S.E.2d at 633-34; cf. Atlantic & N.C.R. Co. v. Atlantic & N.C. Co., 147
N.C. 368, -, 61 S.E. 185, 192 (1908) (communications to a lawyer representing one party to
a lease negotiation are not privileged when they involve a fact necessarily known to both
parties).
72. See, e.g., Hall v. Rixey, 84 Va. 790, 794 (1888) (communications made by an assignor
to the assignee's attorney were not privileged); cf. Virginia-Lincoln Furniture Corp. v.
Southern Factories & Stores Corp., 162 Va. 767, 784-85, 174 S.E. 848, 855 (1934) (communi-
cation by a client to his attorney was not privileged when the client knew that the attorney
had previously worked for the opposing party and the parties were originally working to-
gether for their common advancement).
73. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Griffen, 110 Mass. 181 (1872) (conversation overheard by
concealed officers); Clark v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 187, 261 S.W.2d 339 (1953) (long distance
telephone call between attorney and client overheard by the operator); cf. State v. Sullivan,
60 Wash. 2d 214, -, 373 P.2d 474, 475-76 (1962) ("Although a third party overhearing a
conversation between an attorney and client may testify, the attorney is not thereby quali-
fled."). But see Parker v. Carter, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 273 (1914) (a statement made in a
crowded courthouse was privileged).
74. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 23, § 74.
75. See cases cited supra note 73.
76. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871).
77. Id. at 843; see also United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1335-36 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979) (statements made by a co-defendant to defendant's attorney's
investigator were privileged).
78. Chahoon, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 841-42. The Virginia court asserted:
They had the same defence to make, the act of one in furtherance of the conspiracy,
being the act of all, and the counsel of each was in effect the counsel of all, though,
for purposes of convenience, he was employed and paid by his respective client. They
had a right, all the accused and their counsel, to consult together about the case and
the defence, and it follows as a necessary consequence, that all information, derived
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generally applies if the communication is made to the attorney's or cli-
ent's agent if the agent is employed to aid the attorney in rendering legal
services to the client . Thus, the privilege will protect communications
made to the attorney's clerk, 0  stenographers,8' and private
investigators . 2
However, one Virginia case found the privilege inapplicable to commu-
nications made by a client to the client's or attorney's agent. In Jones v.
Commonwealth,8 3 the Virginia Supreme Court held that the defendant's
communication to a polygraph expert employed by the defendant was not
privileged.8 4 The court never mentioned the attorney-client privilege but
emphasized that the defendant had initiated the request for the test. 5
This decision has been criticized on the basis that the defendant per-
ceived the polygraph test as private and arranged for the session to aid
his attorney in rendering legal services.86
III. LIMITATIONS
A. Waiver
The attorney-client privilege will not apply where the client, by his
conduct, waives his right to assert the privilege.8 7 An express waiver of
the privilege is easy to determine. However, implied waivers can be a pit-
by any of the counsel from such consultation, is privileged, and the privilege belongs
to each and all of the clients, and cannot be released without the consent of all of
them.
Id. at 842.
79. See, e.g., United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961) (presence of accountant
hired by lawyer or client while client is relating a complicated tax story to the lawyer does
not destroy attorney-client privilege); Foley v. Poschke, 137 Ohio St. 593, _ 31 N.E.2d
845, 846 (1941) ("The general rule that communications between an attorney and his client
in the presence of a third person are not privileged does not apply when such third person is
the agent of either the client or the attorney.").
80. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2301.
81. Id.
82. McPartlin, 595 F.2d at 1335-36; see also People v. Meredith, 29 Cal. 3d 682, -, 631
P.2d 46, 50-51, 175 Cal. Rptr. 612, 616-17 (1981) (the privilege is not terminated if an attor-
ney tells his investigator the contents of the client's communications); cf. NLRB v. Harvey,
250 F. Supp. 639, 640-41 (W.D. Va. 1966) (the privilege applies to an attorney's advice to a
client to hire an investigator since such advice constitutes legal services). Further, "the at-
torney-client privilege can be invoked to prevent a physician to whom the client was sent by
his attorneys for examination, as distinguished from advice and treatment, from divulging
the results of the examination." San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court, 55
Cal. 2d 451, -, 359 P.2d 925, 927, 11 Cal. Rptr. 373, 375 (1961) (emphasis in original).
83. 214 Va. 723, 204 S.E.2d 247 (1974).
84. Id. at 725-27, 204 S.E.2d at 249-50.
85. Id. at 725, 204 S.E.2d at 249.
86. Nineteenth Annual Survey of Developments in Virginia Law: 1973-1974, 60 VA. L.
REv. 1542, 1547-48 (1974).
87. Grant v. Harris, 116 Va. 642, 648-49, 82 S.E. 718, 719 (1914).
570 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:559
fall for clients. Certain actions, such as alleging inadequacy of counsel
and testifying at trial, may constitute an unintentional implied waiver."s
If a client attacks his attorney's conduct, he waives the privilege, and
the attorney may testify regarding privileged communications in order to
defend himself. 9 Where a prisoner files a petition for habeas corpus
based upon inadequacy of counsel, the Virginia Code provides that the
privilege is waived "to the extent necessary to permit a full and fair hear-
ing for the alleged grounds."90
Generally, when a party testifies as to communications with his attor-
ney, he has waived the privilege and has no grounds for objection if the
other party calls the attorney to the stand.9 1 However, if the party offers
his own testimony concerning matters other than communications made
to his attorney, there is no waiver of the privilege, and neither the party
nor his attorney must testify regarding confidential communications.2
Similarly, calling the attorney to the stand does not result in a waiver
unless the attorney is questioned as to the privileged matter.9 3
B. Death of the Client
The Virginia court has had several occasions to consider whether the
client's death affects the attorney-client privilege. The issue arises most
often when a court must decide whether an attorney may testify regard-
ing the meaning of his client's will. In Hugo v. Clark,94 the client testator
88. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2327.
89. Pruitt v. Peyton, 243 F. Supp. 907, 909 (E.D. Va. 1965) (where the client filed a peti-
tion for habeas corpus on the grounds of inadequate counsel, the attorney could testify in
regard to the services he supplied).
90. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-654 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
91. Grant v. Harris, 116 Va. 642, 650, 82 S.E. 718, 720 (1914); see also Duplon Corp. v.
Deering Milliken Research Corp., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1162 (D.S.C. 1974) (once a party testi-
fies as to part of a communication, fairness requires that the privilege should not apply even
though the party did not intend to waive it). But cf. Tate v. Tate's Ex'r, 75 Va. (1 Matt.)
522, 532-33 (1881) (even if a party responds to questions concerning privileged information
during cross-examination, the opposing party cannot call his attorney to testify). See gener-
ally 8 J. WIGMOR, supra note 1, § 2327; Annot., 51 A.L.R.2D 521 (1957) and cases cited
therein.
92. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2327 ("The client's offer of his own testimony in
the cause at large is not a waiver for the purpose either of cross-examining him to the
communications or of calling the attorney to prove them." (emphasis in original)).
93. Tate's Ex'r, 75 Va. (1 Matt.) at 533 (dicta). According to Dean Wigmore,
[tihe client's offer of the attorney's testimony in the cause at large is not a waiver so
far as the attorney's knowledge has been acquired casually as an ordinary witness.
But otherwise it is a waiver for, considering that the attorney ought in general not to
be used as a witness, the client ought to be discouraged from utilizing his attorney in
double and inconsistent capacities ....
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2327 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
94. 125 Va. 126, 99 S.E. 521 (1919).
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originally devised all of his property to Clark. The client then directed his
attorney to draft a second will in which he devised all of his property to
charity. Before dying, the client revoked the second will. Clark claimed
that since the second will was revoked, he was entitled to the property.
The client's heirs claimed that the testator intended to invalidate the first
will when he wrote the second will and that they were entitled to the
property by operation of law. The trial court held that the testator's at-
torney, who had drawn up the second will, could not testify concerning
the effect of the second will." ' The Virginia Supreme Court reversed and
held that the privilege did not apply in a will contest to an attorney who
had participated in the preparation and execution of what is alleged to be
a last will.96
In Eason v. Eason,97 the issue was whether an attorney, whose relation-
ship with the testatrix had terminated prior to her death, and who had
not been involved in drawing her will, could testify as to the testatrix's
capacity. The Virginia Supreme Court stated that even if such testimony
should have been admitted, it was merely cumulative.98 The court
thereby avoided the attorney-client privilege issue and decided the case
under the harmless error rule. 9
Other courts have reached different conclusions regarding the effect of
the client's death on the attorney-client privilege. Some courts, without
differentiating between types of claimants, have held that no privilege ex-
ists once the testator dies and that therefore the testator's attorney may
testify concerning the will's contents.100 Such courts either view the attor-
ney's role in drafting a will as that of a mere scrivener 01 or consider cli-
ent confidentiality as intended to be only temporary.10 2 However, other
courts have held that the privilege may be invoked against claimants ad-
verse to the interests of the deceased client, his estate, or his
successors.10 3
95. Id. at 127-28, 99 S.E. at 521-22.
96. Id. at 135, 99 S.E. at 524.
97. 203 Va. 246, 123 S.E.2d 361 (1962).
98. Id. at 254, 123 S.E.2d at 367.
99. Id. Arguably, once the client dies, the privilege should no longer apply in any in-
stance. It is doubtful that such a rule would inhibit full disclosure to any substantial degree.
Furthermore, courts have frequently stated that because of the privilege's tendency to sup-
press the truth, it should be narrowly construed. See, e.g., Virginia-Lincoln Furniture Corp.
v. Southern Factories & Stores Corp., 162 Va. 767, 784, 174 S.E. 848, 855 (1934). See gener-
ally 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 554.
100. See, e.g., Adams v. Flora, 445 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Ky. 1969); Seeba v. Bowden, 86 So.
2d 432, 434 (Fla. 1956); Saliba v. Saliba, 202 Ga. 791, , 44 S.E.2d 744, 753 (1947).
101. See Note, Wills and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 14 GA. L. REv. 325, 330 (1979-80).
For a discussion of the "mere scrivener" rule, see supra text accompanying notes 32-38.
102. See Note, supra note 101, at 331.
103. See, e.g., Glover v. Patton, 165 U.S. 394, 406 (1897) (dicta); Emerson v. Scott, 39
Tex. Civ. App. 65, _, 87 S.W. 369, 369-70 (1905) (asserting that although the privilege may
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C. Subject Matter of the Attorney-Client Relationship
A significant factor underlying the availability of the attorney-client
privilege has been the purpose for which the attorney seeks protection
against disclosure. The context of attorney-client communications may
influence some courts to recognize the privilege in order to preserve the
client's reasonable expectation of confidentiality. Conversely, society's in-
terests in the swift administration of justice, in free access to information,
or in the prevention of future harm may lead the courts to place severe
limitations on the availability of the privilege.
Conflicting interests of confidentiality and disclosure are particularly
acute in the criminal context. A criminal defendant may have his liberty
and his reputation at stake during a trial. Consequently, his attorney
must force the prosecutor to prove every aspect of the criminal charge
and will zealously protect against disclosure of incriminating communica-
tions. However, if such information can prevent the commission of future
crimes, courts may find the privilege inapplicable under the
circumstances.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO CLIENT
IDENTITY AND FEE INFORMATION
A. General Disclosure Requirements for Client Identity and Fee
Information
Generally, information regarding a client's identity or fee information is
not protected by the attorney-client privilege.104 Where the issue has
arisen, most courts have held that neither the client's identity nor the
payment of fees is a confidential communication between the attorney
not apply if all parties to the action claim property through the will, it may be asserted by
the client's heirs, representatives and devisees against a party not claiming through the will
or under the testator).
104. For cases stating the general rule, see In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1984);
In re Witness Before The Special March 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489, 491 (7th Cir. 1984);
Phaksuan v. United States (In re Osterhoudt), 722 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1983); Schofield
v. United States, 721 F.2d 1221, 1222 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Free-
man), 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11th Cir. 1983); Lahodny v. United States (In re Marger/Mer-
enbach), 695 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir. 1982); Waxman v. United States (In re Sales), 695 F.2d
359, 361 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Twist), 689 F.2d 1351, 1352 (11th
Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1982); In
re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1009 (4th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 670-71, reh'g denied, 521 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Harvey,
349 F.2d 900, 904 (4th Cir. 1965); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637-38 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 630-31 (9th Cir.
1960); United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 752 (1944).
See also C. MCCORMIcK, supra note 23, § 90.
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and his client.10 5 Despite this general rule, some courts have held that the
client's identity and fee information are privileged under certain
circumstances. 06
The case most often cited for the exception is Baird v. Koerner.07
Courts influenced by Baird have recognized that the rule excluding client
identity and fee information from the protection of the privilege is a flexi-
ble one. 08 Subsequent cases, however, have misstated the Baird rule,
thereby creating considerable confusion as to when the privilege will
apply.10 9
The Baird decision and its progeny may be explained by two rationales
supporting nondisclosure of client identity and fee information: the in-
crimination rationale and the confidential communication rationale.110
McCormick has stated that
[i]t is arguable that the decisions following Baird ... [have] blazed a false
trail in making the exceptions to the rule turn largely upon the severity of
potential harm to the client rather than upon the question whether the pro-
tection afforded works in aid of a legitimate function of the attorney in his
professional role."'
This part of the note will first examine the confidential communication
rationale supporting the Baird decision. Second, it will discuss the cases
following Baird and reliance on the incrimination rationale. Third, this
section will review the recent decisions that have strongly criticized the
incrimination rationale and have reasserted the confidential communica-
tion rationale underlying Baird. Finally, this section will discuss the im-
pact these decisions will have on the attorney-client privilege and on the
relationship between the attorney and his client.
105. See generally supra note 1.
106. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
107. 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
108. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 23, § 90, at 216.
109. See, e.g., Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d at 593 ("[A]ppellant's confusion as to the meaning of
the exception is based upon a misstatement of the Baird rule in subsequent opinions.").
110. The distinctions between reliance on the incrimination rationale or on the confiden-
tial communication rationale are subtle. As the Shargel court stated,
[W]e have consistently held that client identity and fee information are, absent
special circumstances not privileged. This result follows from defining the privilege to
encompass only those confidential communications necessary to obtain informed legal
advice. This definition, which focuses upon facilitating the role of the lawyer as a
professional advisor and advocate, is to be distinguished from the so-called "incrimi-
nation rationale," which focuses upon whether the materials sought may be used as
evidence against the client.
Shargel, 742 F.2d at 62 (citation omitted).
111. C. MCCORUCK, supra note 23, § 90, at 216 (footnotes omitted).
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B. The Baird Decision
In Baird v. Koerner,"' an attorney sent a check to the IRS on behalf of
certain unnamed clients. 11 He indicated that it had been determined that
additional taxes were due.124 The IRS then subpoenaed the attorney to
compel him to reveal his clients' identities."1 5 Asserting the attorney-cli-
ent privilege, the attorney refused to answer the subpoena.1
The Ninth Circuit held that the clients' identities were privileged117
The court adopted a careful, case-by-case analysis and held, "[i]f the
identification of the client conveys information which ordinarily would be
conceded to be part of the usual privileged communication between attor-
ney and client, then the privilege should extend to such identification in
the absence of other factors." ' 8 In Baird, disclosure of the clients' identi-
ties would have revealed not only their names but also that they owed
taxes. 19 Under these circumstances, the disclosure of the clients' identi-
ties would have revealed confidential communications between the clients
and their attorney, including the clients' motivations for seeking legal
advice.' O
The court also stated in dicta that the disclosure of a client's identity
"may well be the link that could form the chain of testimony necessary to
convict an individual of a federal crime." " ' It is important to note that
the court's decision, however, is based upon the fact that so much infor-
mation had already been disclosed that revelation of the clients' identities
would -have disclosed a confidential communication. 22
C. Development of the Incrimination Rationale
The development of the incrimination rationale for nondisclosure of cli-
ent identity and fee information began with the Fifth Circuit's decision in
112. 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
113. Id. at 626.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 627.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 633.
118. Id. at 632.
119. Id. at 630.
120. See generally J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2291 (the ultimate motive for seeking
legal advice should be privileged).
121. Baird, 279 F.2d at 633 (footnote omitted).
122. Id. at 631-32; see also NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1965) (relying on
Baird and holding that revealing the client's name would have disclosed a confidential com-
munication). Harvey also expanded the Baird rule when it stated that, "[tihe privilege may
be recognized when so much of the actual communication has already been disclosed [not
necessarily by the attorney, but by independent sources as well] that identification of the
client amounts to disclosure of a confidential communication." Id. at 905.
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United States v. Jones.23 The Jones decision initiated a judicial shift
from the confidential communication rationale announced in Baird to an
emphasis on the incrimination rationale."4
In Jones, six criminal attorneys from south Texas were subpoenaed
before a grand jury investigating the alleged narcotics and income tax vio-
lations of certain named individuals. 25 The subpoenas directed the attor-
neys to bring with them all records, retainer agreements, books, and re-
ceipts showing payment of attorney's fees for the accounts of specific,
named clients who had either recently been convicted of or were then
under arrest or indictment for large-quantity marijuana offenses." 6 The
prosecutor stated that he sought the information from the attorneys be-
cause he had other information that certain individuals had paid large
fees to their attorneys while reporting small incomes to the IRS."' The
attorneys refused to answer the subpoenas, asserting the attorney-client
privilege. They were subsequently held in contempt of court.1 2
Relying on Baird, the Fifth Circuit stated that the attorney-client priv-
ilege should apply when "so much of the substance of the communica-
tions is already in the government's possession that additional disclosures
would yield substantially probative links in an existing chain of inculpa-
tory events or transactions.""29 The court held that prosecutors could not
summon attorneys before the grand jury to obtain client names or fee
information when that information would be useful to the government for
the sole purpose of corroborating or supplementing incriminating infor-
mation already possessed by the government."30
The Fifth Circuit later took the incrimination rationale in Jones one
step further in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick)."3' In Pavlick, an
attorney refused to tell a federal grand jury the name of the individual
who had paid him money for representing three defendants in a drug con-
spiracy case. The attorney asserted that his disclosure of the fee informa-
123. 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975).
124. See infra text accompanying note 129.
125. Jones, 517 F.2d at 668-69.
126. Id. at 668.
127. Id. at 673. The government counsel stated that "[t]he problem is this: Mr. A. says he
made twenty-thousand dollars, but in fact he paid these attorneys thirty thousand in a par-
ticular year of unreported income and unreported expenses. It is conceivable that there may
be income tax violations." Id.
128. Id. at 669.
129. Id. at 674 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 672 (quoting Baird, 279 F.2d at 633).
131. 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc). See also Comment, The Attorney-Client
Privilege As a Protection of Client Identity: Can Defense Attorneys Be The Prosecution's
Best Witnesses?, 21 Ah. CRua L. REV. 81 (1983), for a thorough analysis of the Pavlick
decision.
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tion would violate the attorney-client privilege and result in his client's
indictment.
The Pavlick court recognized the general obligation of an attorney to
disclose client identity and fee information, but the court refused to re-
quire disclosure and relied on the rationale in Jones."'3 The court stated
that the privilege would apply "when the disclosure of the client's iden-
tity by his attorney would have supplied the last link in the existing
chain of incriminating evidence likely to lead to the client's indict-
ment."' 33 The Pavlick court's reasoning for the incrimination rationale
varied significantly from the standard announced in Jones, which had re-
quired that the evidence need be only a "substantially probative link."''
The Ninth Circuit adopted another variation of the incrimination ra-
tionale in the case of United States v. Hodge & Zweig. 35 In Hodge &
Zweig, two attorneys were summoned by the IRS and directed to produce
various fee information pertaining to a named client."s6 The attorneys re-
fused, asserting the attorney-client privilege, 3 ' and the district court or-
dered their compliance.
The Ninth Circuit, relying on Baird, reversed the district court, stating
that "[a] client's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements
may be privileged where the person invoking the privilege can show that
a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information would im-
plicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was
sought."' 18 This "legal advice" exception relied on the incrimination ra-
tionale, rather than the confidential communication rationale actually an-
nounced in Baird.
These three decisions following Baird adopted variations of the ration-
ale, even though the Baird court expressly relied on the confidential com-
132. Pavlick, 680 F.2d at 1027. The grand jury granted immunity to the defendants and
each waived his right to claim the attorney-client privilege. Each defendant stated that he
did not know who posted bond or who was paying Pavlick. Id. One defendant stated that
when he was recruited for the drug-smuggling venture, he was promised that he would be
taken care of if arrested. Id.
133. Pavlick, 680 F.2d at 1027 (emphasis added). The court refers specifically to Jones
when stating this rule.
134. Jones, 517 F.2d at 674; see also Pavlick, 680 F.2d at 1033 (Politz, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the majority opinion's reliance on Jones for the standard was misplaced).
135. 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977).
136. Id. at 1349. The fee information sought was (1) payments from the client for his own
defense, (2) payment from the client for the defense of others, and (3) records of payments
received from any other persons on behalf of the client.
137. Id. at 1350-51. The attorneys also asserted a fifth amendment claim that the court
rejected. Id. at 1351.
138. Id. at 1353 (citing Baird, 279 F.2d at 630).
[Vol. 19:559
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
munication rationale. This use of multiple rationales in applying the at-
torney-client privilege to client identity and fee information situations
has created considerable confusion among the federal circuits.1 9
D. Recent Criticism of the Incrimination Rationale
In four recent circuit court decisions the incrimination rationale has
been strongly criticized. 140 These cases suggest that the confusion as to
the meaning of the exception and the development of the incrimination
rationale are based upon a misstatement of the Baird rule. 4 1
In In re Osterhoudt,142 a grand jury subpoena directed an attorney to
disclose the amounts and dates of payments of fees by a named client.
43
The government sought the information for possible income tax and con-
trolled substance prosecutions. 44 The district court denied the motion to
quash and the client appealed.
45
The client asserted the "legal advice" exception 46 as announced in
Hodge & Zwieg.147 He stated the exception should apply because he hired
the attorney to represent him in the very same grand jury investigation
for which the information was sought. 4 The Ninth Circuit rejected the
"legal advice" rationale and held that "[f]ee arrangements usually fall
outside the scope of the privilege simply because such information ordi-
narily reveals no confidential professional communication between attor-
ney and client, and not because such information may not be
incriminating. 1
49
The Ninth Circuit stated that subsequent cases have mistakenly formu-
lated the Baird exception to the general disclosure requirement.1 0 The
139. See cases cited supra note 104.
140. See In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Witnesses Before The Special
March 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591 (9th
Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1983).
141. March 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d at 492-93; Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d at 593; Grand
Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d at 452-54.
142. 722 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982).
143. Id. at 592.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977); see also supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
148. Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d at 592.
149. Id. at 593 (emphasis added).
150. Id. The court referred to the following language in Baird:
The name of the client will be considered privileged matter where the circumstances
of the case are such that the name of the client is material only for the purpose of
showing an acknowledgement of guilt on the part of such client of the very offenses
on account of which the attorney was employed ....
Baird, 279 F.2d at 633 (quoting 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 283(e) (1957)).
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court noted that "[tihe principle of Baird was not that the privilege ap-
plied because the identity of the client was incriminating, but because in
the circumstances of the case disclosure of the identity of the client was
in substance a disclosure of the confidential communication. .. .
In In re Witnesses Before the Special March 1980 Grand Jury,'5 ' the
Seventh Circuit also rejected the use of the incrimination rationale in
connection with disclosure of fee information.' The attorneys in the case
had refused to produce fee information on their client to a grand jury.'M
The district court held that because the fee information might become a
link in a chain of evidence which might incriminate the client, the attor-
ney-client privilege prevented the production of the information.15
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court decision and held that
"[b]ecause the attorney-client privilege protects only confidential commu-
nications, we decline the. . . invitation to adopt a rule protecting any fee
information which might incriminate the client."' 5 The court also stated
that a "client's identity or fee arrangement may be privileged where so
much is already known that the identity or fees would reveal the client's
confidential communication that he or she may, for example, have been
involved in specific criminal conduct."'' 57
In criticizing the incrimination rationale, the court noted that the mere
possibility that fee information might incriminate the client does not
transform such information into a confidential communication. 58 The
court explained that "[tihe fact that the information is incriminating may
provide all parties with their motives to seek its disclosure or protection;
however, the application of the privilege turns not upon incrimination per
se but upon whether disclosure would in effect reveal information which
has been confidentially communicated.' ' 59
The Sixth Circuit also rejected the incrimination rationale in In re
Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35.11 ° The case arose out- of a Federal
Bureau of Investigation inquiry into the theft of numerous checks drawn
on fictitious corporations. The FBI had traced one of the checks to the
attorney's law firm.' 6 ' The attorney, asserting the attorney-client privi-
lege, refused to disclose the identity of the client to whose credit the pro-
151. Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d at 593 (emphasis added).
152. 729 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1984).
153. Id. at 494.
154. Id. at 490. All three attorneys acknowledged representing the same person.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 494-95.
157. Id. at 494.
158. Id. at 492.
159. Id. at 494.
160. 723 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1983).
161. Id. at 448.
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ceeds had been applied.'62 The attorney informed the court that disclos-
ure of his client's identity could implicate that client in criminal activity,
and that therefore, he was justified in invoking the attorney-client
privilege.' 63
The Sixth Circuit reviewed the cases which had developed the incrimi-
nation rationale. 164 The court rejected the "last link" exception articu-
lated in Pavlick, stating that "the exception is simply not grounded upon
the preservation of confidential communications and hence not justifiable
to support the attorney-client privilege."16 5 The court also noted that
"[a]lthough the last link exception may promote concepts of fundamental
fairness against self-incrimination, these concepts are not proper consid-
erations to invoke the attorney-client privilege."' 66 The court concluded
that the "last link" exception "has no roots in concepts of confidential
communication [and cannot] support an abdication of the general rule
M167
The most recent decision criticizing the incrimination rationale is In re
Shargel. 16 In Shargel, a federal grand jury issued a subpoena requiring
an attorney, Mr. Shargel, to produce records of any monies or property
transferred to him by or on behalf of ten named individuals. 6 9 Eight of
the ten had been recently indicted for violating the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organization Act. 70 The government stated that it sought
the information as evidence of unexplained wealth, tax violations, and
payment of fees by benefactors.' 7 1 Mr. Shargel refused to disclose the in-
formation, asserting the attorney-client privilege. 7 2
In the district court proceeding, Shargel asserted that disclosure of fee
information and client identity would disclose confidential communica-
tions he had with the six clients who had consulted with him before they
were subpoenaed, indicted, or arrested.' His two claims were that (1)
162. Id. at 448-49.
163. Id. at 449. In fact, an FBI agent had told the attorney and the judge that an arrest
would be made immediately following the disclosure of the identity of the client.
164. Id. at 452-55.
165. Id. at 454 (emphasis in original).
166. Id.
167. Id. Although the court was willing to recognize the "legal advice" exception, it held
that because the attorney failed to move for an ex parte in camera hearing, he had not met
his burden of production. Id. at 454-55.
168. 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984).
169. Id. at 62.
170. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982).
171. Shargel, 742 F.2d at 62.
172. Id. In asserting the privilege Shargel stated that he had provided legal representa-
tion to eight of the ten individuals, six of those eight in connection with the acts named in
the RICO indictment, and the other two he represented in other matters.
173. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Shargel), No. M1l-199 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27,
1984), affd sub nom. In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1984).
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the subpoenaed material "reflects each client's concern that he was in
trouble and thus, in practical effect, discloses a confidential communica-
tion" 174 and (2) "in this multiple client situation, the timing of the several
representations vis-a-vis each other might reveal more of those same cli-
ents' confidential communications (e.g., that client A was involved with
clients B and C). ' '115
The district court held that Shargel's first claim was not persuasive be-
cause his clients might have consulted him for any number of reasons
unrelated to the present indictment.1176 As to the second claim, the court
held that it would not apply under the circumstances because of the gov-
ernment's expressed intent not to infer conspiratorial conduct based on
Shargel's joint representation of eight of the individuals named in the
subpoena.117 However, the court went on to say that if the government
were to assert that inference, then disclosure of their identities would
constitute a communication between Shargel and his clients. 1 8 The court
also stated that the information "would be more than merely incriminat-
ing . . . . [It] would be effectively revealing a confidential communica-
tion, namely that six of his clients were acting in concert with each other
at a time before they had reason to seek his advice.1 79
Although the district court clearly recognized that disclosure of the
subpoenaed information would reveal a confidential communication, it
denied the motion to quash. 80 The court required only that the govern-
ment refrain from using the information to prove the communications in
the pending RICO prosecution, but otherwise allowed the government to
use the information for whatever purpose it might choose.81
The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court, rejecting Shargel's argu-
ment that once the attorney-client privilege attaches to a communication,
the government may not use the information for any purpose. 82 Judge
Winter, writing the opinion for the court, stated that "[t]he identification
of individuals as clients of Mr. Shargel neither discloses nor implies a
confidential communication."' 83 He rejected the argument that a confi-
dential communication about criminal activity may be inferred from con-
sultation with a criminal law specialist.' 84
174. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Shargel), slip op. at 2.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 4.
177. Id. at 5.
178. Id. at 5 n.1.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 5.
181. Id.
182. Brief for Appellant at 14-16, In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1984).
183. Shargel, 742 F.2d 61.
184. Id. at 64 n.4.
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The court held that a general rule requiring disclosure of the fact of
consultation does not place the attorney in the professional dilemma of
cautioning against disclosure and thus rendering perhaps ill-informed ad-
vice.""' The court explained that no such dilemma is created, because the
information will not be protected "even though the client may strongly
fear the effects of disclosure, including incrimination."86 Judge Winter
stated that "[t]his result follows from defining the privilege to encompass
only those confidential communications necessary to obtain informed le-
gal advice, which focuses upon facilitating the role of the lawyer as a pro-
fessional advisor and advocate, . . . [as] distinguished from the so-called
'incrimination rationale' ... .1187 He further stated that "[w]hile the at-
torney-client privilege historically arose at the same time as the privilege
against self-incrimination, it was early established that the privileges had
distinct policies and that. . . the attorney's reluctance to incriminate his
client was not a valid reason to invoke the attorney-client privilege."' 18
E. Future of the Incrimination Rationale
Baird v. Koerner'8 9 created an exception to the general rule that client
identity and fee information are not protected by the attorney-client
privilege. Several cases relying on the Baird exception have misstated the
general rule and have created a much broader "incrimination rationale"
for nondisclosure. These cases have ignored the potential harm that the
incrimination rationale would create. As the Shargel court noted, "a
broad privilege against the disclosure of the identity of clients and fee
information might easily become an immunity for corrupt or criminal
acts."18 0 Thus, the rationale for the attorney-client privilege is premised
not on the fear of incriminating the client, but on the need for effective
communication between the attorney and his client.
The incrimination rationale continues to survive in the Fifth Circuit. It
has held that the attorney-client privilege should apply when "so much of
the communication is already in the government's possession that addi-
tional disclosures would yield substantially probative links in an existing
chain of inculpatory events or transactions."1 9 ' The Fifth Circuit relied on
Baird in reaching its holding, but incorrectly emphasized the result of the
revelation-incrimination of the client-rather than whether the revela-
tion would disclose a confidential communication.
185. Id. at 63.
186. Id. (emphasis added).
187. Id. at 62.
188. Id. at 63.
189. 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
190. In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984).
191. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 674, reh'g denied, 521 F.2d 815
(5th Cir. 1975).
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The Fifth Circuit realized that its decision in Jones would not be fol-
lowed by other courts.'92 In fact, except for another Fifth Circuit decision,
Pavlick, it has not been widely accepted. The Seventh Circuit, in In re
Witnesses Before the Special March 1980 Grand Jury,9' rejected the
Jones holding.9 4 The Seventh Circuit stated that "[t]he fact that the in-
formation is incriminating may provide all parties with their motives to
seek its disclosure or protection; however, the application of the privilege
turns not upon incrimination per se but upon whether disclosure would
in effect reveal information which has been confidentially
communicated."' 19
In addition, the Fifth Circuit adopted a variation of the incrimination
rationale-the "last link" exception. The court held that the attorney-
client privilege would apply "when the disclosure of the client's identity
by his attorney would have supplied the last link in the existing chain of
incriminating evidence likely to lead to the client's indictment."'9 " This
"last link" exception was rejected by the Sixth Circuit in In re Grand
Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35.'19 The Sixth Circuit stated that the last
link exception "is simply not grounded upon the preservation of confiden-
tial communications and hence not justifiable to support the attorney-
client privilege."' 98 The court also stated that "[a]lthough the last link
exception may promote concepts of fundamental fairness against self-in-
crimination, these concepts are not proper considerations to invoke the
attorney-client privilege."
9 9
The Ninth Circuit created another variation of the incrimination ra-
tionale by its decision in United States v. Hodge & Zweig.200 This case
was later rejected by the Ninth Circuit in In re Osterhoudt.20' In Hodge
& Zweig, the court had held that "[a] client's identity and the nature of
the client's fee arrangements may be privileged where the person invok-
ing the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure
of the information would implicate that client in the very criminal activ-
ity for which legal advice was sought."' 2 In its subsequent rejection of
this version of the incrimination rationale, the Ninth Circuit in Os-
192. Id. at 668. ("In all candor, we need not and do not purport to reach a result which
may be reconciled in all respects with every decision by every other court.").
193. 729 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1984).
194. Id. at 494.
195. Id.
196. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982).
197. 723 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1983).
198. Id. at 454 (emphasis in original).
199. Id.
200. 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977).
201. 722 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1983).
202. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d at 1353 (citing Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 630 (9th
Cir. 1960)).
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terhoudt held that "[flee arrangements usually fall outside the scope of
the privilege simply because such information ordinarily reveals no confi-
dential professional communication between attorney and client, and not
because such information may not be incriminating. 2 0 3 The court also
stated that "[tihe principle of Baird was not that the privilege applied
because the identity of the client was incriminating, but because in the
circumstances of the case disclosure of the identity. . . was in substance
a disclosure of the confidential communication.
'20 4
Although the Second, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have all re-
jected the incrimination rationale, it may still be applicable elsewhere.
However, it is unlikely that the incrimination rationale will survive, ex-
cept in the Fifth Circuit where Jones and Pavlick were decided. The most
recent decisions have strongly criticized the incrimination rationale, and
the trend among the circuits is to draw a bright line rule that client iden-
tity and fee information are not protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege. Only under the unique facts of Baird does it appear that the privi-
lege will be applied.
Today, it appears that Baird will be read as narrowly as possible. It
also appears that the confidential communication cannot simply be vol-
unteered by the attorney. For instance, in Shargel the court stated that
"[a]lthough Mr. Shargel's affidavit volunteers a connection beween his
consultation with these six clients and the subsequent RICO proceeding,
this connection could not have been inferred from the disclosure of client
identity and fee information.
'20 5
Although the purpose of the attorney-client privilege will be frustrated
somewhat by not extending it to client identity and fee information, 20
the alternative of allowing the legal profession to fall prey to corrupt and
criminal activities clearly outweighs this concern. By not allowing the at-
torney-client privilege to attach to client identity and fee information, at-
torneys can adequately advise their clients as to what information will be
privileged. This will enable clients to make full disclosure to their attor-
neys, free from apprehension that the privileged information will be used
against them. As the Second Circuit concluded in Shargel, "[t]he bar and
the system of justice will suffer little if all involved are aware that as-
sumed safety from disclosure does not exist.1
20 7
203. Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d at 593.
204. Id.
205. Shargel, 742 F.2d at 64.
206. See id. at 63 ("[The fact of consultation and the payment of a fee may be precondi-
tions to seeking legal advice, and we would be less than candid not to concede that the lack
of a privilege against disclosure ... may discourage some persons from seeking legal advice
at all.").
207. Id. at 64.
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V. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF A
CRIME
A facet of the attorney-client privilege of particular concern to the
criminal defense attorney deals with instrumentalities of a crime. The
practitioner is faced with two competing principles-fidelity to his client
and the maintenance of confidentiality versus his role as an officer of the
court. 08 The criminal defense attorney must also consider the defen-
dant's constitutional right to counsel and right against self-incrimination
and his own potential for criminal culpability in deciding how to handle
the instrumentalities problem.209
This part of the note will review present legal views regarding an attor-
ney's possession of instrumentalities of a crime as opposed to attorney-
client communications regarding instrumentalities. Ethical and legal con-
siderations posed by such situations will then be examined. Finally, a pro-
posal will be advanced to aid attorneys in dealing with instrumentalities.
The focus herein will be on how an attorney can safeguard the attorney-
client privilege while avoiding ethical violations which could subject him
to discipline.210
A. Communications and Tangible Evidence-The Issue of Possession
The parameters of the attorney's duties and obligations with regard to
the instrumentalities of a crime depend on the immediacy and directness
of the attorney's involvement with, and access to, the instrumentalities.
Two opinions by the Legal Ethics Committee of the Virginia State Bar
illustrate the importance of the attorney's knowledge of and control over
208. See Comment, The Problem of an Attorney in Possession of Evidence Incriminating
His Client: The Need for a Predictable Standard, 47 U. CIN. L. REv. 431, 436 (1978) ("The
attorney has the same legal duty as any other citizen to cooperate with government investi-
gations and to provide evidence sought by the government.").
209. In addressing the situation, courts have long recognized the competing principles
confronting the attorney:
In the present case we do not have a situation that readily lends itself to the applica-
tion of one of the general rules applicable to the attorney-client privilege. Here, we
enter a balancing process which requires us to weigh that privilege (which is based on
statute and common law), and.. . the privilege against self-incrimination (which is
constitutional), against the public's interest in the criminal investigation process.
State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, -, 394 P.2d 681, 684 (1964) (an attorney
can retain possession of physicial evidence for a reasonable period of time before surrender-
ing the evidence to the government).
210. Proceedings regarding the withholding of evidence and effective assistance of coun-
sel, while important tangential considerations, are beyond the scope of this note. Further-
more, while some overlap is unavoidable, this part of the note will deal primarily with the
attorney's role regarding instrumentalities of a crime. Questions involving a lawyer's actions
concerning fruits of a crime include considerations of safeguarding property rights and re-
ceiving stolen property.
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such evidence.
Legal Ethics Opinion 386 reads:
An attorney representing a defendant in a criminal matter has no obligation
to reveal to the Commonwealth's Attorney the whereabouts of a weapon
discovered during his investigation, when the attorney did not remove or
take steps to conceal the weapon. ... If the attorney determined to dis-
close the existence of a weapon, the attorney's client should be informed
prior to any disclosure. . . . The attorney has no duty, however, to protect a
third party who is not his client who may become involved in removal or
concealment of such weapon.
211
Legal Ethics Opinion 551 states:
A defense attorney has a legal duty to turn over any documents which are
fruits or instrumentalities of the crime. The attorney must first inform his
client of his intention to reveal the documents. Furthermore, it is incum-
bent upon the defense attorney to determine what evidence constitutes
fruits or instrumentalities of the crime. [DR 7-108(A) 2 12 & 6-101(C) 2 13 and
In re Ryder21 ]. 215
The opinions are valuable insofar as they (1) confirm the absence of a
duty on the part of the attorney to reveal the location of instrumentalities
discovered during his investigation, and (2) mandate disclosure if the at-
torney has gone beyond mere discovery and observations of the object(s)
in question. The key to mandatory revelation lies in the possession, or
lack thereof, of the instrumentality by the attorney.2 16
211. Va. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm. Op. 386 (1983).
212. "A lawyer shall not suppress any evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation
to reveal or produce." VA. CODE OF PROFEsSIONAL RESPONSImrrY DR 7-108(A) (1983).
213. "A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about matters in which the law-
yer's services are being rendered." Id. DR 6-101(C).
214. 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967). See infra notes 217-20 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Ryder case.
215. Va. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm. Op. 551 (1983).
216. Other jurisdictions are in accord with Virginia on this point. See, e.g., 53 U.S.L.W.
2330 (Gen. Jan. 8, 1985) (discussing Formal Opinion 1984-76 of the California State Bar
Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct).
In 1981, the Ethics Committee of the Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Asso-
ciation proposed a more flexible disclosure standard. The "Ethical Standard to Guide Law-
yer Who Receive [sic] Physical Evidence Implicating His Client in Criminal Conduct" reads
as follows:
(a) A lawyer who receives a physical item under circumstances implicating a client
in criminal conduct shall disclose the location of or shall deliver that item to law
enforcement authorities only (1) if such is required by law or court order, or (2) as
provided in paragraph (d).
(b) Unless required to disclose, the lawyer shall return the item to the source from
whom the lawyer receives it, as provided in paragraphs (c) and (d). In returning the
item to the source, the lawyer shall advise the source of the legal consequences per-
taining to possession or destruction of the item.
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A leading case in this area is In re Ryder,217 a disciplinary proceeding.
In that case, a Richmond, Virginia, attorney transferred what appeared to
be the weapon used in a bank robbery, and the money garnered from that
robbery, from his client's safety deposit box to his own. The courts that
considered and reviewed the Ryder case flatly rejected any notion that
the attorney-client privilege protected Ryder's actions.21s Ryder was sus-
pended from the practice of law for eighteen months for his initiative in
concealing the evidence.
21
1
As one commentator has noted, "[t]he Ryder opinion is partly based on
the impropriety of the attorney's taking the initiative in procuring in-
criminating evidence. 's 20 What if, instead of taking the initiative to gain
possession of the evidence and alter its location, the attorney takes no
initiative, but yet is the receiver of an instrumentality of a crime? Accept-
ance of the instrumentality would make the attorney an active partici-
pant in withholding evidence from the police, prosecution, and courts.
Whether the attorney actively or passively engages in the concealment
of the instrumentality, the attorney nonetheless faces a strong argument
against application of the attorney-client privilege:
Even though delivered to the attorney by the client in the strictest of confi-
dence, physical evidence generally does not have the same immunity from
disclosure under the attorney-client privilege as confidential verbal commu-
(c) A lawyer may receive the item for a period of time during which the lawyer: (1)
intends to return it to the owner; (2) reasonably fears that return of the item to the
source will result in destruction of the item; (3) reasonably fears that return of the
item to the source will result in physical harm to anyone; (4) intends to test, examine,
inspect or use the item in any way as part of the lawyer's representation of the client;
or (5) cannot return it to the source. If the lawyer retains the item, the lawyer shall
do so in a manner that does not impede the lawful ability of law enforcement to
obtain the item.
(d) If the item received is contraband, or if in the lawyer's judgment the lawyer
cannot retain the item in a way that does not pose an unreasonable risk of physical
harm to anyone, the lawyer shall disclose the location of or shall deliver the item to
law enforcement authorities.
(e) If the lawyer discloses the location of or delivers the item to law enforcement
authorities under paragraphs (a) or (d), or to a third party under paragraph (c)(1),
the lawyer shall do so in the way best designed to protect the client's interests.
29 CRiM. L. REP. (BNA) 2465-67 (Aug. 26, 1981). For a discussion of this proposed standard,
see Martin, Incriminating Criminal Evidence: Practical Solutions, 15 PAc. L.J. 807, 869-72
(1984).
217. 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va. 1967) (per curiam), aff'd per curiam, 381 F.2d 713 (4th
Cir. 1967). For commentary, see Note, Professional Responsibility and In re Ryder: Can an
Attorney Serve Two Masters?, 54 VA. L. REv. 145 (1968); Comment, An Attorney in Posses-
sion of Evidence Incriminating His Client, 25 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 133 (1968).
218. Ryder, 263 F. Supp. at 365-67; Ryder, 381 F.2d at 714.
219. 263 F. Supp. at 370.
220. Comment, Disclosure of Incriminating Physical Evidence Received From a Client:
The Defense Attorney's Dilemma, 52 U. COLo. L. REv. 419, 437 (1981).
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nications. The courts cannot compel the attorney to reveal the existence or
location of physical evidence if he learns of it as the direct result of a verbal
communication from his client. Should the attorney take possession of the
physical evidence, however, he cannot legally withhold it if ordered by the
court to produce it. In most instances, physical evidence simply is not
privileged.221
A number of courts, while recognizing that the attorney-client privilege
does not extend to physical evidence, nonetheless acknowledge the diffi-
cult dilemma faced by the attorney torn between fidelity to his client and
fulfillment of his duty to the court. As a result, a rule has been fashioned
in some jurisdictions that allows attorneys to avoid the possibly devastat-
ing effects that production of instrumentalities of a crime can generate.
Succinctly stated, "a criminal defense attorney has an obligation to turn
over to the prosecution physical evidence which comes into his possession
.... After turning over such evidence, an attorney may have either a
right or a duty to remain silent as to the circumstances under which he
obtained such evidence .... "222 In essence, the doctrine means that the
evidence itself does not come under the privilege, but the source of the
evidence, i.e., the fact that the state received the instrumentality from the
defense attorney who in turn received it from his client, would be
privileged.
In addition to turning over physical evidence, the attorney must be
aware of the possible ramifications if he alters the evidence. For example,
in State v. Fisher,22 3 an attorney received a one year suspension from the
practice of law for altering evidence in a murder case. 224 Such alterations
of evidence are not always easy to detect, e.g., wiping fingerprints off a
221. Comment, supra note 201, at 438; see also Comment, Ethics, Law, and Loyalty: The
Attorney's Duty to Turn Over Incriminating Physical Evidence, 32 STAN. L. REV. 977, 981
(1980) (stating that the attomey-client privilege rarely applies to physical evidence unless
the evidence was created in the course of the attorney-client consultation).
222. Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200, 1207 (Alaska 1978) (attorney did not violate attor-
ney-client privilege, ethical principles, or his client's right to effective assistance of counsel
by aiding client's friend in revealing physical evidence to the state); accord People v. Lee, 3
Cal. App. 3d 514, 526, 83 Cal. Rptr. 715, 722 (1970) (public defender properly surrendered
blood-stained shoes given to attorney by client's wife); Anderson v. State, 297 So.2d 871, 875
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (attorney-client privilege prohibited attorney or his employee
from disclosing the source of allegedly stolen items delivered by the client to the attorney's
employee); People v. Nash, 110 Mich. App. 428, -, 313 N.W.2d 307, 314 (1981), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 418 Mich. 196, 341 N.W.2d 439 (1983) (defendant's attorney did not
violate the attorney-client privilege by relinquishing physical evidence to the state; however,
evidence produced at trial revealing that the objects were obtained from the attorney did
violate the privilege).
223. 170 Neb. 483, 103 N.W.2d 325 (1960).
224. The attorney forced the end of a dowel through a hole in a leather belt, thereby
enlarging the hole and damaging the belt's probative value. Id. at _, 103 N.W.2d at 328;
see also In re Bear, 578 S.W.2d 928 (Mo. 1979) (en banc) (reprimand given to attorney for
erasing a tape recording which was to be used as evidence in a criminal matter).
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weapon; nonetheless, the attorney still has a duty to preserve the "integ-
rity" of the evidence. 2 5
One court has included the duty to reveal the circumstances under
which the evidence was found within the attorney's duty to produce in-
strumentalities of the crime in his possession. The California Supreme
Court held that "whenever defense counsel removes or alters evidence,
the [attorney-client] privilege does not bar revelation of the original loca-
tion or condition of the evidence in question. '226 If carried to its logical
conclusion, any alterations in the integrity or the location of the evidence
may fall outside of the privilege, and defense counsel may be forced to
testify as to the original condition of the evidence (e.g., the condition of
the knife before being cleaned of blood).
Even if a defense attorney does not take possession of an instrumental-
ity of a crime, he must remain cautious in counseling his client in refer-
ence to the object. The loss of the attorney-client privilege is not the only
pitfall. If an attorney counsels his client to dispose of or conceal such
evidence, the client's action may violate the law,227 and the attorney may
225. 29 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2466 (comments by attorney Charles English in reference to
the "Ethical Standard to Guide Lawyer Who Receive [sic] Physical Evidence Implicating
His Client in Criminal Conduct," proposed by the Ethics Committee of the Criminal Justice
Section of the American Bar Association. See supra note 216.).
226. People v. Meredith, 29 Cal. 3d 682, 695, 631 P.2d 46, 54, 175 Cal. Rptr. 612, 620
(1984) (footnote omitted). In Meredith, defense counsel's investigator removed a partially
burned wallet from a garbage can behind the defendant's house. Counsel examined the wal-
let, which belonged to a murder victim, then turned it over to the police. The court ruled
that such actions prevented the state from observing the wallet in its original location, and
that the attorney-client privilege did not prevent the state from presenting evidence regard-
ing the location of the wallet and the garbage. For additional commentary, see Note, People
v. Meredith: The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Criminal Defendant's Constitutional
Rights, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1048 (1982); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Hear No Evil,
See No Evil, Speak No Evil? People v. Meredith, 20 Hous. L. REv. 921 (1983).
Justice Brickley of the Supreme Court of Michigan relied on the Meredith decision in
formulating his opinion in People v. Nash, 418 Mich. 196, 341 N.W.2d 439 (1983). He wrote
that there is
a difference between an attorney observing evidence and knowing of its location and
an attorney taking possession of evidence from a place he has learned about from his
client. In the latter case, the attorney diminishes, if not destroys, the usefulness of
evidence. And it makes no difference that the "place" from where the evidence is
taken is the client.
Id. at -, 341 N.W.2d at 450. As a result, Justice Brickley would not hold the source of the
evidence to be a privileged communication, regardless of whether that source was the client
himself. None of the justice's colleagues joined in those parts of his opinion dealing with the
attorney-client privilege.
227. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 135 (West 1970):
DESTROYING EVIDENCE. Every person who, knowing that any book, paper, record,
instrument in writing, or other matter or thing, is about to be produced in evidence
upon any trial, inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized by law, willfully de-
stroys or conceals the same, with intent thereby to prevent it from being produced, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
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be subject to both ethical2 " and legal229 sanctions.2 30
The privilege is not lost, however, where the attorney's involvement
does not go beyond communications and observations. In People v.
Belge,2 31 an attorney was indicted for violating public health laws for fail-
ing to disclose the location of a murder victim's body. Belge learned of
the location through his client, and he inspected the body without dis-
turbing it. In dismissing the indictment, the court relied in part on the
attorney-client privilege as a justification for the attorney's failure to dis-
close.232 Other courts have concurred in the Belge decision in commenting
on communications and observations in the context of the attorney-client
privilege.233
B. Ethical and Legal Considerations
1. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility
A criminal defense attorney confronted with instrumentalities of a
crime must always concern himself with his ethical obligations. However,
instead of alleviating an attorney's concerns, the applicable Model Code
provisions aggravate the conflicts in his obligations.2 34
]228. In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent.
MODEL CODE DR 7-102(A) (1982).
229. See infra notes 263-68 and accompanying text.
230. Clark v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 187, 261 S.W.2d 339 (1953). For example, one instance
in which the attorney's advice to his client regarding instrumentalities was not privileged
was the case of a telephone operator who overheard the attorney advise his client to dispose
of a murder weapon. In refusing to extend the attorney-client privilege to this exchange, the
court noted that such advice "was not in the legitimate course of professional employment
in making or preparing a defense at law." Id. at __, 261 S.W.2d at 347.
231. 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 50 A.D.2d 1088, 376
N.Y.S.2d 771 (1975), afl'd, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d 377, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976).
232. Id. at -, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 800-03. For commentary on the circumstances surround-
ing Beige, see Comment, Legal Ethics: Confidentiality and the Case of Robert Garrow's
Lawyers, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 211 (1975).
233. See, e.g., People v. Meredith, 29 Cal. 3d 682, 693, 631 P.2d 46, 52, 175 Cal. Rptr. 612,
618 (1981) ("The attorney-client privilege is not strictly limited to communications, but ex-
tends to protect observations made as a consequence of protected communications.") (foot-
note omitted).
234. This conflict is not new to the Model Code, but was present in the old American Bar
Association's Canons of Professional Ethics. One commentator noted that "[b]y imposing
broad duties of undivided fidelity to the client and devotion to his interests, yet at the same
time candor and fairness to the court, the Canons seemed to suggest that both the withhold-
ing of physical evidence and its disclosure were required." Comment, supra note 220, at 419
(footnote omitted).
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a. Canon 4-Fidelity to Client
Canon 4235 of the Model Code deals with the confidential relationship
between an attorney and his client. "The confidentiality principle is the
product of a fiduciary relationship which exists between a lawyer and his
client. It is greater in scope than the lawyer-client privilege .... "236 The
purpose behind such a principle is to "ensure that a client may freely
inform his lawyer of any and all pertinent facts and circumstances. "2 37
Disciplinary Rule 4-101(B) prohibits an attorney from "[r]evealing a
confidence or secret of his client 3 s or "using a confidence or secret of his
client to the disadvantage of the client."23 s A literal reading of such rules
indicates that the actions of the client in bringing the instrumentalities of
a crime to the attorney impose a duty on the attorney not to reveal the
existence of such instrumentalities or turn them over to the proper au-
thorities. However, the Model Code is not absolute.
Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C) provides a number of "escape valve" provi-
sions under which an attorney may disclose such information. Interest-
ingly, the language of DR 4-101(C) is permissive rather than mandatory
in reference to the attorney's disclosure of confidences or secrets. 40 In
particular, DR 4-101(C) provides that an attorney may reveal confidences
or secrets with the consent of his client after full disclosure,2 41 or as "per-
235. "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client." MODEL CODE
Canon 4 (1981).
236. Abramovsky, Confidentiality: The Future Crime-Contraband Dilemmas, 85 W. VA.
L. REv. 929, 931 (1983).
237. Id.
238. MODEL CODE DR 4-101(B)(1) (1981); see also id. EC 4-1, 4-4.
239. Id. DR 4-101(B)(2); see also id. EC 4-5.
240. The Final Draft of the American Bar Association's MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT (1982) continues to utilize such permissive language:
Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client un-
less the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph
(b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between
the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim
against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond
to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (Final Draft 1982) (emphasis added).
For commentary, see generally Crystal, Confidentiality Under the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, 30 U. KAN. L. REV. 215 (1982).
241. MODEL CODE DR 4-101(C)(1) (1981).
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mitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order."242 In
addition, disclosure of confidential information is permitted if necessary
to prevent the client from committing a crime,2 43 or to allow the attorney
to collect a fee or defend against a charge of wrongdoing.2 44
b. Canon 7-Duty to the Court-Zealous Representation Within the
Bounds of the Law
The key word in the text of Canon 7245 is "within"-i.e., the attorney's
actions must be "within" the law. To this end, most of the wording of
Canon 7 is mandatory rather than permissive. For example, DR 7-102(A)
speaks of disclosing what "is required by law, '246 not assisting a client in
activity which a lawyer "knows to be illegal,"247 and not engaging in "ifile-
gal conduct. '248 DR 7-109(A) also uses mandatory language: "A lawyer
shall not suppress any evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation
to reveal or produce. 24 .
Canon 7 suggests that the obligation to reveal instrumentalities of a
crime depends upon the legality or illegality of withholding such objects.
In turn, the applicability of the attorney-client privilege will determine
whether the attorney can lawfully withhold evidence of a crime. Thus,
Canon 7 would not be violated if the attorney-client privilege can be suc-
cessfully invoked in refusing to reveal instrumentalities.
2. The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
242. Id. DR 4-101(C)(2). See infra notes 269-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the legal requirement to reveal instrumentalities.
243. Id. DR 4-101(C)(3). Courts have long recognized that the attorney-client privilege
must give way to the importance of preventing future criminal acts on the part of the client-
"[T]he interests of public justice further require that no shield such as the protection af-
forded to communications between attorney and client shall be interposed to protect a per-
son who takes counsel on how he can safely commit a crime." Clark v. State, 159 Tex. Crim.
187, -, 261 S.W.2d 339, 347 (1953). Such a ruling gives support to the attorney who deter-
mines that he will, in accordance with the permissive language of DR 4-101(C), reveal his
client's intention to commit a crime.
For a general discussion of the problems confronting an attorney in a DR 4-101(C)(3)
situation, see Note, The Attorney's Duty to Reveal a Client's Intended Future Criminal
Conduct, 1984 DuKE L.J. 582 (advocating a rule that allows the attorney a considerable
amount of discretion in deciding whether to reveal a client's intent to commit a crime).
244. MODEL CODE DR 4-101(C)(4) (1981).
245. "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law." Id..
Canon 7 (1981).
246. Id. DR 7-102(A)(3).
247. Id. DR 7-102(A)(7).
248. Id. DR 7-102(A)(8).
249. Id. DR 7-109(A) (emphasis added); see also id. EC 7-27.
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part that "[n]o person. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself ... ."'5o The client's privilege against self-in-
crimination is an important concern for the attorney confronted with in-
strumentalities of a crime.
The United States Supreme Court has set guidelines as to what types
of evidence, when revealed, constitute self-incrimination. In Schmerber v.
California,51 the Court stated "that the [fifth amendment] privilege pro-
tects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or
otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communica-
tive nature .... ,,"51 Schmerber had challenged his conviction under a
state drunk driving law that required the extraction of blood from his
body. The Court held that blood could be taken because the extraction
process was neither testimonial nor communicative. Instead, it was
merely a means of gathering real evidence, and it is well-settled that
"[t]he privilege against self-incrimination refers only to communicative
and not 'real' evidence. ' '25 3 Instrumentalities of a crime would, of course,
be considered "real" evidence.
The Supreme Court has also addressed the question of the transferabil-
ity of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination from the
client to his attorney. In Fisher v. United States," 4 the defendants were
under investigation for possible federal income tax violations. The defen-
dants gave relevant documents to their attorneys. Thereafter, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service sought disclosure of the documents. The Court, em-
phasizing the personal nature of the fifth amendment privilege, held that
the attorney could be compelled to disclose the documents. 55
Lower court rulings also support the proposition that the fifth amend-
ment privilege is not transferable. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
250. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
251. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
252. Id. at 761.
253. See, e.g., State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, -, 471 P.2d 553, 565 (1970).
254. 425 U.S. 391 (1975).
255. As the Court noted:
The Fifth Amendment protects a person from being compelled to be a witness
against himself. Here, the taxpayers retained any privilege they ever had not to be
compelled to testify against themselves and not to be compelled themselves to pro-
duce private papers in their possession. This personal privilege was in no way de-
creased by the transfer. It is simply that by reason of the transfer of the documents
to the attorneys, those papers may be subpoenaed without compulsion on the tax-
payer. The protection of the Fifth Amendment is therefore not available .... A
party is privileged from producing evidence but not from its production ....
Id. at 398-99 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913) (emphasis in origi-
nal). For commentary on Fisher, see Note, The Rights of Criminal Defendants and the
Subpoena Duces Tecum: The Aftermath of Fisher v. United States, 95 HARv. L. REv. 683
(1982).
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stated in In re January 1976 Grand Jury (Genson v. United States),25
"no basis is discernible for thinking that the Fifth Amendment testimo-
nial privilege was intended to allow an attorney to suppress or secrete the
physical fruits of an armed robbery. ' 257 In Genson, the court ruled that
an attorney could not use the fifth amendment to prevent the U.S. gov-
ernment from obtaining cash that the attorney's clients, suspects in a
bank robbery, had turned over to the attorney. While Genson dealt with
the fifth amendment privilege in the context of the fruits of a crime, an
attorney confronted with instrumentalities of a crime is in an analogous
situation.258
3. The Sixth Amendment and the Right to Effective Assistance of
Counsel
One reason for allowing an attorney to withhold evidence through invo-
cation of the right to counsel is that a client will be less likely to confide
in his attorney if the attorney can be compelled to produce incriminating
evidence.259 Even if this view of the sixth amendment is too broad, a de-
fense counsel is still obliged to keep his client's secrets and confidences.260
In many cases, courts look to the effect of disclosure on attorney com-
petency in determining whether a defendant's sixth amendment rights
have been violated by his attorney's actions in revealing evidence. How-
ever, where nondisclosure would breach a legal obligation imposed on the
attorney by law, there can be no violation of the defendant's sixth amend-
ment rights when defense counsel reveals the existence of physical evi-
dence.2 61 The client must be aware, and the attorney must make him
256. 534 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1976).
257. Id. at 724.
258. A number of lower courts have addressed the problem of instrumentalities (or other
physical evidence) and the transferability of the client's fifth amendment privilege to the
attorney. See, e.g., United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d 1129, 1131-32 (5th Cir. 1979) (the
instrumentality of the alleged crime-brass knuckles-was properly obtained from the de-
fendant's attorney without violating the fifth amendment); Gipson v. State, 609 P.2d 1038,
1043-44 (Alaska 1980) (the state could obtain a defense expert's report on tests performed
on the firearm used in an alleged murder without violating the defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination); State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, __, 394 P.2d 681, 686
(1964) ("There is no reason to extend the privilege against self-incrimination to the attorney
because the client is already protected in his relations with his attorney by the attorney-
client privilege."). See supra note 209, and infra notes 282-85 and accompanying text for
explanation of the Olwell holding.
259. Comment, supra note 220, at 443; see also Freedman, Where the Bodies Are Buried-
The Adversary System and the Obligation of Confidentiality, 10 CRIM. L. BULL. 979, 985
(1974); Comment, Fruits of the Attorney-Client Privilege: Incriminating Evidence and
Conflicting Duties, 3 DuQ. L. REv. 239, 241 (1965).
260. See supra notes 235-44 and accompanying text.
261. See Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200, 1211-12 (Alaska 1978). The client was charged
with, inter alia, kidnapping. The client's friend discovered a legal pad on which the client
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aware, of the lawyer's other duties as an officer of the court. Telling the
attorney about a crime or the location of the instrumentalities or fruits
involved therein does not remove the attorney from his relatively passive
role of information-gatherer, confidante, and advocate. However, when
the client puts such instrumentalities or fruits in the hands of the attor-
ney, the attorney moves from a passive posture to the active position of
concealing evidence from the court, contrary to his duties as an officer of
that court.2
62
4. The Attorney's Criminal Culpability
The attorney confronted with instrumentalities of a crime, in addition
to concerning himself with constitutional, legal, and ethical questions,
must also be alert not to engage in criminal activity. One commentator
stated that "[a] determination that [an attorney's] conduct is outside
'proper' conduct for an attorney or outside the attorney-client privilege is
a prerequisite for the conduct to be criminal, because, if within the privi-
lege, the conduct is ipso facto legal. '
26 3
Possible criminal liability for an attorney can arise from statutes in-
volving obstruction of justice,2 ' concealment or destruction of evi-
dence, 65 tampering with evidence,2 6 hindering apprehension or prosecu-
tion,2 7 and accessory liability.268
had allegedly sketched a kidnapping plan. After revealing the pad to counsel, who reasona-
bly concluded that a state statute required disclosure, counsel aided the friend in transfer-
ring it to the police.
262. For a detailed discussion regarding the effective assistance of counsel in instrumen-
tality-related situations, see Martin, supra note 216, at 838-46.
263. Comment, The Right of a Criminal Defense Attorney to Withhold Physical Evi-
dence Received from His Client, 38 U. CHL L. REv. 211, 218 (1970).
264. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1982).
265. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 135 (West 1970). A recent Oklahoma disciplinary pro-
ceeding applied that state's anticoncealment statute. In State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v.
Harlton, 669 P.2d 774 (Okla. 1983), the court affirmed an attorney's five year suspension
from the practice of law for the attorney's part in concealing a shotgun used in the commis-
sion of a crime.
266. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.7 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); see also In re
Bear, 578 S.W.2d 928 (Mo. 1979) (attorney who erased a tape recording to be used in a
criminal matter was reprimanded for tampering with evidence).
267. See, e.g., 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5105 (Purdon 1983). Two Cundersport, Pennsyl-
vania, attorneys were recently convicted of violating this statute by retaining possession of a
gun butt that a client allegedly used in a murder. Stewart, Legal Limbo: How Two Lawyers
Fell Into an Ethical Thicket Defending a Murder, Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
268. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-19 (Repl. Vol. 1982). For cases treating an attorney's
action as accessory involvement, see In re Ryder, 381 F.2d 713, 714 (4th Cir. 1967); State ex
rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Harlton, 669 P.2d 774, 777 (Okla. 1983); Clark v. State, 159 Tex.
Crim. 187, -, 261 S.W.2d 339, 347 (1953).
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5. Disclosure Under Legal Requirement
In certain circumstances, an attorney may be required by law to reveal
the confidences of his client.269 Whether an attorney is "required by law
or court order"270 to turn over instrumentalities of a crime depends in
large part on the existence and scope of the attorney-client privilege.
Much of the litigation in this area arises from the government's use of
subpoenas or search warrants in an attempt to obtain evidence from an
attorney or a third party. In Fisher v. United States,271 the attorney re-
ceived a summons directing him to turn over certain tax-related docu-
ments. The Court ruled that the summons, if directed towards the tax-
payer himself, would not involve self-incrimination.27 2 Thus, the attorney-
client privilege could not prevent a prosecutor from obtaining the docu-
ments from the attorney. 273
The Supreme Court has also ruled that a search warrant can be used to
obtain documents from an attorney's office,2 74 and search the property of
a third party for fruits, instrumentalities or the evidence of a crime.275
Lower courts have followed the dictates of the Supreme Court in ruling
on production of evidence.27 6
Furthermore, courts generally accept the view that evidence received
by the attorney from a non-client third party is not protected by the at-
torney-client privilege. 27 7 Hence, such evidence is readily obtainable from
the attorney, and the attorney may also be required to testify as to its
source.
278
In another situation involving a possible legal duty to disclose, the at-
torney in People v. Beige279 was indicted for violation of public health
269. Crystal suggests that an attorney has a duty to disclose the confidences of his client
"if the failure to disclose would constitute a crime, expose the lawyer to civil liability, or
violate a court or administrative order or rule. A client's mere violation of the law does not
mean that a lawyer has a legal duty to disclose confidential information." Crystal, supra
note 240, at 219.
270. MODEL CODE DR 4-101(C)(2) (1981).
271. 425 U.S. 391 (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 254-55.
272. 425 U.S. at 409-14.
273. Id. at 405.
274. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
275. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
276. United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1979) (subpoena duces tecum
used to obtain brass knuckles from the defendant's attorney); People v. Investigation Into a
Certain Weapon, 113 Misc. 2d 348, 448 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (subpoena duces tecum
required attorney to produce ammunition and clip before grand jury).
277. Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200, 1210 (Alaska 1978); Dyas v. State, 260 Ark. 176,
539 S.W.2d 251, 256 (1976); People v. Lee, 3 Cal. App. 3d 514, 527, 83 Cal. Rptr. 715, 723
(Ct. App. 1970).
278. Morrell, 575 P.2d at 1210.
279. 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 50 A.D.2d 1088, 376
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laws. In dismissing the indictment, the court said that the attorney's duty
to his client outweighed any duty the attorney had to obey "the trivia of a
pseudo-criminal statute." 80 However, the court noted that, if Belge had
been indicted for "obstruction of justice under a proper statute, [then]
the work of this Court would have been much more difficult than it is."'281
Other courts have attempted to deal with the problem of required dis-
closure by balancing the attorney's duties to his client against the public
interest in criminal investigations. In State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwell,'8 ' the
Supreme Court of Washington ruled that evidence could be withheld
under the attorney-client privilege "for a reasonable period of time" to
enable the attorney to prepare his defense.28 3 As one commentator has
pointed out, however, this holding causes more problems than it solves.28 4
Nowhere does the court define the term "reasonable time." Furthermore,
if in fact the attorney needed the evidence to prepare his case, "[t]hat
purpose could be adequately served by requiring that the evidence be
promptly turned over to the authorities, while providing that the attorney
be entitled to repossession for such time as required to aid him in prepar-
ing his case.' '2 8
5
The Model Code provides a final alternative for the lawyer presented
with instrumentalities of a crime. If the client "[ilnsists that the lawyer
pursue a course of conduct that is illegal or that is prohibited under the
Disciplinary Rules,"'' " the lawyer may be permitted to withdraw.
C. Analysis and Proposal
Analysis of the dilemma faced by the attorney confronted with instru-
mentalities of a crime leads to the conclusion that neither the fifth or
sixth amendments nor the attorney-client privilege provides a justifiable
reason to withhold instrumentalities of a crime in the attorney's posses-
sion. Likewise, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility is suffi-
ciently ambiguous to be of little use to the defense attorney who seeks to
suppress such evidence for ethical reasons. This is not to suggest, how-
ever, that the defense attorney must become an arm of the state, provid-
ing unlimited assistance in the prosecution of his client. The attorney can
attempt to provide some balance between his legal obligation to produce
the evidence and his ethical obligation to aid his client and preserve cli-
N.Y.S.2d 771 (1975), affl'd, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d 377, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976); see
supra text accompanying notes 231-32.
280. Id. at -, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 803.
281. Id.
282. 64 Wash. 2d 828, -, 394 P.2d 681, 684 (1964); see supra note 209.
283. Id.
284. Comment, supra note 263, at 228.
285. Id.
286. MODEL CODE DR 2-110(C)(1)(c) (1981).
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ent confidences.
Prevention is often the best cure.287 With this in mind, the defense at-
torney will do well to avoid the situation of being presented with instru-
mentalities. This can be accomplished by informing the client at the first
meeting of the attorney-client privilege in regard to communications. The
client should be made aware, however, that the privilege is not without
limit, and that only communications are privileged. Physical evidence
does not fall within the privilege, and the attorney is duty-bound not to
withhold such evidence from the prosecution.
Undoubtedly, some clients will ignore the attorney's initial warnings
and insist on delivering instrumentalities of a crime to the attorney. If
that happens, the attorney should not take possession of the object(s),
and the client should be reminded of the instructions given him at the
initial meeting.288 Admittedly, in some cases, the "refusal to accept evi-
dence is a strong indication to the client that he should destroy it.
'289
Granted, if such an indication occurs, the result is not desirable. The evi-
dence will either be destroyed,290 thereby obstructing justice, or the client
will be caught in his attempt to destroy the evidence. Unfortunately,
there may be no perfect solution to this dilemma. However, the procedure
outlined here insulates the attorney from active participation in the sup-
pression of evidence and allows him to protect the confidences and secrets
of his client.2 91'
If the client ignores these repeated warnings, the attorney should in-
form him that by leaving the evidence with the lawyer, he impliedly con-
sents to having it turned over to the prosecutor. Such a procedure would
insulate the attorney from disciplinary charges. Disclosure of secrets and
confidences is permissible with the consent of the client.292
Once a client has ignored all warnings and placed the instrumentalities
in the possession of the attorney, the attorney must produce the evidence.
It must be remembered, however, that the attorney, by performing such
an act, is not abandoning his client's defense. While the object itself can-
not be excluded from evidence, the attorney-client privilege provides the
287. Other commentators have noted the need for client education in such a situation.
See Martin, supra note 216, at 873-74; Comment, supra note 220, at 449.
288. See Note, supra note 217, at 190-92, for a discussion of the various alternatives avail-
able to an attorney in such a situation.
289. Comment, supra note 263, at 213.
290. For a discussion of the destruction of evidence issue, see generally Note, Legal Eth-
ics and the Destruction of Evidence, 88 YALE. L.J. 1665 (1979).
291. See Saltzburg, Communications Falling Within the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66
IOWA L. REV. 811, 829-35 (1981) (arguing that once evidence is shared with the attorney and
then destroyed, the attorney-client privilege should not apply to prevent the attorney from
testifying about the evidence.
292. MODErL CODE DR 4-101(C)(1); see also id. EC 4-2.
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necessary safeguard to prevent the lawyer from becoming a witness
against his client. In addition, if the Otwell rule were universally adopted,
it would prevent the prosecution from commenting on the source of the
evidence.2 93
In addition, once the client places an instrumentality in the possession
of the attorney, the attorney is faced with the dilemma of choosing a
method of delivery to the prosecutor. One school of thought advocates the
use of "anonymous methods of return. . such as registered mail with no
return address, a cooperative police officer, or the least attractive
method-'clandestine' return. '294
The use of an anonymous form of return, however, may only compound
an attorney's ethical and legal problems. The value of an instrumentality
of a crime lies not in the physical object itself, but in the object's connec-
tion to the alleged crime. Although anonymous delivery of the object to
the proper authorities does not impair the prosecution's case, the police
and prosecution are still faced with the difficult task of linking the anony-
mous instrumentality to the alleged crime. In that regard, the attorney
may well be guilty of abusing his professional responsibility not "to take
possession of and secrete the . . instrumentalities of a crime. ' '295
The attorney confronted with instrumentalities of a crime faces a di-
lemma that carries no ideal solution. However, the three-part solution of
prevention by client education, required disclosure of items in the attor-
293. As the Qiwell court stated:
We think the attorney-client privilege should and can be preserved even though the
attorney surrenders the evidence he has in his possession. The prosecution, upon re-
ceipt of such evidence from an attorney, where charge against the attorney's client is
contemplated (presently or in the future), should be well aware of the existence of the
attorney-client privilege. Therefore, the state, when attempting to introduce such evi-
dence at the trial, should take extreme precautions to make certain that the source of
the evidence is not disclosed in the presence of the jury and prejudicial error is not
committed. By thus allowing the prosecution to recover such evidence, the public
interest is served, and by refusing the prosecution an opportunity to disclose the
source of the evidence, the client's privilege is preserved and a balance is reached
between these conflicting interests. The burden of introducing such evidence at a trial
would continue to be upon the prosecution.
State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, -, 394 P.2d 681, 685 (1964) (footnote
omitted).
294. 29 CRI. L. REP. (BNA) 2466 (Aug. 26, 1981) (remarks of attorney Charles English in
reference to the "Ethical Standard to Guide Lawyer Who Receive [sic] Physical Evidence
Implicating His Client in Criminal Conduct," proposed by the Ethics Committee of the
Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Association); see supra note 216.
Clandestine return of physical evidence poses other risks for the criminal defendant and
his attorney. One case found that the person making the clandestine return could not rely
on the attorney-client privilege, even if he were a fellow attorney. The attorney-client privi-
lege would not apply because the attorney making the delivery was not retained for legal
advice and counsel. Hughes v. Meade, 453 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970).
295. In re Ryder, 381 F.2d 713, 714 (4th Cir. 1967).
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ney's possession, and a prohibition on the introduction of evidence con-
cerning the source of the instrumentality would adequately protect the
attorney from active participation in obstruction of justice while not vio-
lating his client's confidence. In this regard and because of the need for a
clear standard, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility should be
amended to include the following:
A lawyer shall, in a criminal matter, upon initial contact with the client,
inform the client of the existence of the attorney-client privilege and the
scope of the privilege in regard to protection of communications between
attorney and client. The client shall also be informed that the privilege does
not extend to physical evidence. As an officer of the court, an attorney is
obliged to produce physical evidence which falls into his possession. If, after
such information has been made available to the client, the client then
places physical evidence in the possession of the attorney, the client will be
deemed to have consented to the revelation of the evidence to the proper
authorities.
VI. CONCLUSION
The modern purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage cli-
ents to make full disclosure to their attorneys, free from apprehension
that the information will be used against them. 96 In order for the privi-
lege to attach, a client must seek legal advice from a professional legal
advisor who is acting in such a capacity. Further, the attorney-client com-
munication must be made in confidence, and the communication must
relate to the purpose for seeking legal advice.29 7 In In re Shargel,298 the
Second Circuit stated that "[t]he underlying theory. . . is that encourag-
ing clients to make the fullest disclosure to their attorneys enables the
latter to act more effectively, justly, and expeditiously, and that these
benefits outweigh the risks posed by barring full revelation in court. '299
However, because the attorney-client privilege prevents disclosure of rele-
vant evidence and impedes the quest for truth, some commentators have
argued that the privilege should be strictly limited and that it should not
apply at all in civil litigation.300 The rationale for eliminating the privilege
in civil litigation is that a net gain for truth-telling would result, the jus-
tice system would be enhanced, and the result of a trial would not be
dependent upon the relative abilities of the attorneys. 30 1 The Shargel
court, for example, stated that the privilege must be strictly construed
296. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 403 (1976). See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 23, § 87.
297. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
'298. 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984).
299. Id. at 62 (quoting J. WEINsTEiN & U BFaER, EvmENCE 503(02) (1982)).
300. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291; Frankel, The Search for Truth Continued:
More Disclosure, Less Privilege, 54 U. CoLo. L. REv. 51, 51 (1982).
301. Frankel, supra note 300, at 52-53.
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within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its
principle.3 0 2
Other commentators have argued that an absolute privilege should be
maintained in both civil and criminal litigation. 3 Proponents of this
view assert that under our present judicial system, it is absolutely neces-
sary that a party to litigation secure counsel and that abolition of the
privilege would discourage the full disclosure necessary for a fair trial.304
Furthermore, if the privilege is abolished, a party with a valid claim or
defense may fail to confide in his attorney since he is unaware of the law's
complexities.3 05 In addition, if the privilege is abolished, a client may not
confide in an attorney at all, and therefore, the abolition of the privilege
may not result in any significant gain of information.0 6
Other scholars have taken the compromise view that the privilege
should apply in civil litigation only when its benefit to the attorney-client
relationship outweighs its cost in suppressing the truth.0 Such reasoning
would formalize the informal balancing that appears to take place in the
client identity/fee and instrumentality cases. However, the benefit/cost
balancing test may be hard to apply in practice. It is easy to imagine the
scale being tipped to the side of abandoning the privilege whenever com-
munications to an attorney have a substantial bearing on the issues at
trial. This may lead to the same ultimate effect as abandoning the privi-
lege because a client may feel obligated to conceal important facts from
his attorney.
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302. Shargel, 742 F.2d at 62.
303. See Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L.
REv. 597 (1980).
304. Id. at 604.
305. Id. at 605-07.
306. Id. at 609-10.
307. See, e.g., 8 J. WIGMORE, sitpra note 1, § 2217; see also Note, The Attorney-Client
Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HIRv. L. REv. 464
(1977) (asserting that although criminal defendants have a constitutional right to the privi-
lege under the fifth and sixth amendments to the United States Constitution, the privilege
should only apply to other parties when the balancing process weighs in their favor).
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